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INTRODUCTION 
The California Bankers Association 
is currently sponsoring Assembly Bill 
2521 (Johnston, Vuich). This bill, which 
is a two-year bill pending in the Assem-
bly Finance and Insurance Committee, 
proposes to rewrite the entire California 
Financial Code division dealing with 
banks. The bill exceeds three hundred 
pages in printed form. It would repeal 
hundreds of current sections of Division 
One of the Financial Code and add 494 
new sections of code. It proposes hun-
dreds if not thousands of changes in the 
language of current law. The Superin-
tendent of Banking has described the 
bill as one which "tilts the balance" in 
favor of the banking industry. Testify-
ing before a joint hearing of the Assem-
bly Finance and Insurance Committee 
and the Senate Banking Committee, the 
Superintendent also stated that there is 
no urgent need to rewrite the banking 
law. He said, "The banking law does 
work ... we should be very careful about 
breaking it. "1 
As created in the Financial Code,2 
the State Department of Banking licens-
es and regulates state-chartered banks, 
offices of foreign ( other nation) banks 
doing business in California, and trust 
companies. Under the current banking 
law, state-chartered and foreign banks 
must secure the approval of the Super-
intendent of Banking to merge with an-
other bank,3 sell the bank or a business 
unit of the bank,4 acquire another bank,5 
*Editor's Note: The Center for Public 
Interest Law invited the California Bank-
ers Association to participate in this 
article, which we intended to publish in 
a point-counterpoint format. We sought 
CBA 's purposes behind AB 2521 and its 
responses to Consumers Union's con-
cerns about the bill. CBA declined to 
participate. 
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the California Credit and Finance Pro-
ject of the West Coast Regional Office 
of Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. Con-
sumers Union opposes AB 2521. 
open or close a branch office,6 engage in 
transactions with members of the board 
of directors or officers,7 or engage in 
certain other activities. Among the Super-
intendent's responsibilities are seeking a 
conservatorship over banking institutions 
which are incompetent or insolvent, and 
liquidating insolvent banking institu-
tions.8 In 1987 alone, five state-chart-
ered banks failed.9 
Some of the largest banks operating 
in California have federal charters and 
therefore are regulated principally by 
the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency of the U.S. Treasury, rather 
than by the State Department of Bank-
ing. 10 The banks regulated by the 
Department, however, constitute a sig-
nificant portion of the California market. 
According to the most recent completed 
annual report of the State Department 
of Banking, there are 279 state-chartered 
banks with 1,683 branches throughout 
California. 11 These banks have assets of 
$91.2 billion. 12 The number of state-
chartered banks increased 66% in the 
decade from 1978 to 1987. 13 The fourth 
largest bank in California, First Inter-
state, is state-chartered. 
Foreign banks regulated by the De-
partment of Banking also are a signifi-
cant presence in California. Eleven of 
California's top 25 banks are subsidi-
aries of foreign banks. In addition, 
offices of foreign banks which do not 
have separately chartered California sub-
sidiaries have assets of $68.3 million in 
California. 14 
Banking regulation addresses the 
entry into and conduct of the banking 
business for the purpose of protecting 
the public. 15 Consumers are protected 
through the Department's enforcement 
of specific laws governing bank conduct, 
and are protected from bank insolvency 
through the significant but indirect 
means of enforcing laws designed to 
prevent activities that might weaken a 
bank's financial condition, such as fail-
ure to diversify investments, bad manage-
ment, or self-dealing transactions which 
might drain the bank of necessary cap-
ital or wrongly transfer its assets. With 
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these purposes in mind, the current 
banking law absolutely prohibits certain 
conduct, and allows other conduct only 
with the permission of the Superintend-
ent of Banking. The California Bankers 
Association's proposal would both elimin-
ate certain prohibitions and make it 
easier to secure permission to engage in 
other activities. 
It is impossible to predict all the 
effects of the bankers' extensive proposal 
to rewrite the banking law. Problems 
may be created by repealing existing 
sections and rewriting them in new 
language, including confusion about the 
application of interpretations of current 
sections to new and rewritten sections. 
There are also numerous specific ways 
in which the changes proposed in this 
bill would directly harm consumers. 
First, the bill would hurt consumers by 
weakening the regulatory powers of the 
Superintendent of Banking. Second, the 
bill would reduce specific existing con-
sumer rights, including the right to pre-
vent a bank from seizing customer funds 
in low-balance checking accounts to set 
off against a debt to the bank, the right 
to seek damages against a bank which 
has violated a consumer protection stat-
ute, the right to withdraw funds from a 
certificate of deposit if the deposit is 
sold to another bank, and other rights. 
Finally, the bill fails to address serious 
problems which consumers have experi-
enced with banks. These problems raise 
a fundamental concern about the appro-
priateness of the banking industry pro-
posing to rewrite the law which governs 
its activities. 
THE BILL WOULD HARM 
CONSUMERS BY WEAKENING 
BANK REGULATION 
The changes proposed by AB 2521 
would weaken bank regulation in a num-
ber of important ways. First, the bill 
would direct the Superintendent to act 
to "facilitate" the banking business. It 
would create ambiguity in the statutory 
standards for Banking Department ap-
proval of sales, mergers, and similar 
1 
2 
transactions. It would permit anticompeti-
tive bank sales and mergers even when 
the harm to competition is not out-
weighed by any expected benefit of the 
sale or merger. It would establish strict 
timelines for the Superintendent of Bank-
ing to act on applications by banks for 
regulatory approval, and would require 
that many types of applications are auto-
matically approved if the timelines are 
not met. It would also limit the power 
of the Superintendent to refer suspected 
violations of civil laws to city attorneys, 
district attorneys, and the Attorney Gen-
eral for civil prosecution. Finally, the 
bill would create new discretion in the 
Superintendent of Banking to reduce 
the degree of regulation of the banking 
industry. It would allow the Superin-
tendent to exempt banks from statutory 
and regulatory requirements, to decide 
that whole classes of activity need not 
be regulated at all, or to waive any 
regulation of the Department of Banking. 
AB 2521 Directs 
The Superintendent 
to "Facilitate" 
the Business of Banking 
The bill directs the Superintendent 
of Banking to exercise his or her powers 
"in a manner that facilitates the conduct 
of the banking and trust businesses with-
in this state and promotes the financial 
safety and soundness of these business-
es .... " 16 This part of the bill reveals, 
perhaps unintentionally, the underlying 
philosophy of the Bankers Association's 
proposal: that banking regulation should 
serve the banking industry. 
AB 2521 May Permit 
Transactions Which Adversely 
Affect Competition 
Presently, a bank may not merge 
with another bank, buy the assets of 
another bank, or acquire control of an-
other bank without approval of the 
Superintendent of Banking_17 Current 
law permits approval of such trans-
actions only if any anticompetitive 
effects of the transactions are clearly 
outweighed by the probable improve-
ment in public convenience, and the 
transaction will not "result in a mon-
opoly. "18 AB 252 I keeps the require-
ment that mergers and sales not result 
in a monopoly, but eliminates the Super-
intendent's required examination of other 
effects on competition. 19 
Retention of the "no-monopoly" stand-
ard is not enough to protect the competi-
tive environment. An acquisition of 
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control can have an anticompetitive 
effect without resulting in a monopoly. 
For example, according to statistics for 
I 988 reported in American Banker Statis-
tical Special Top Numbers 1989, the 
three banks in California with the largest 
market share of deposits had 72.8% of 
the total amount of deposits held by the 
top fourteen commercial bank deposit 
takers. The top four banks had 8 I .4% of 
these deposits. The total deposits held 
by the single largest deposit-taking com-
mercial bank was 34 times greater than 
the deposits held by the tenth largest 
deposit taker, and 62 times greater than 
the deposits held by the fourteenth 
largest deposit taker. These statistics 
demonstrate a continuing need to fully 
examine the effects on competition of 
proposed bank sales and mergers. 
Californians need a competitive bank-
ing system. Economists at the Federal 
Reserve have reported that banking in 
California "is characterized by a higher 
degree of concentration than markets in 
other major banking states. ''2° Banks in 
California have historically paid lower 
interest on deposits and charged higher 
interest rates on consumer loans than 
banks in other states. 21 The California 
Bankers Association has responded to 
expressions of concern about the deletion 
of the effect on competition test by point-
ing out that banks and trust companies 
remain subject to the antitrust laws. 
However, an antitrust suit to enjoin or 
undo a transaction is an inadequate sub-
stitute for careful review by the regulator 
of the effect of the transaction on com-
petition before the transaction is first 
approved. 22 
The Bill Would Make 
Regulatory Standards Ambiguous 
Current law allows the Superintend-
ent to approve applications for permis-
sion to engage in various activities such 
as sales of a bank, bank mergers, and 
acquisition of control of a bank only if 
each criterion set forth in the relevant 
statutory section is satisfied. 23 These 
conditions compel disapproval of a merg-
er if the transaction would result in a 
monopoly; the financial condition of an 
entity acquiring a bank or trust company 
would be detrimental to the financial 
condition of the bank or trust company; 
the competence, experience, and integrity 
of the acquiring person shows that it 
would not be in the best interest of the 
depositors, creditors, shareholders, or 
the public to permit that person to con-
trol the bank; the proposed acquisition 
is unfair, unjust, or inequitable to the 
depositors, creditors, or shareholders of 
the acquired bank or the acquiring en-
tity; or the applicant for approval fails 
or refuses to furnish all the information 
required by the Superintendent of Banking. 24 
Under AB 2521, the Superintendent 
of Banking could approve a sale, merger, 
or acquisition of control of a bank or 
trust company even if the transaction 
fails one or more of these tests.is The 
bill identifies "decisional criteria" which 
"must be considered", but does not re-
quire that an application for sale or 
merger of a bank must be denied if any • 
statutory criterion is not met.26 
Many commentators believe that the 
ongoing crisis in the savings and loan 
industry was caused in part by inade-
quate regulatory oversight. In light of 
the serious dangers of lax regulation, it 
is inappropriate to restructure the Finan-
cial Code so that the Superintendent of 
Banking need only "consider" various 
factors, and to allow the Superintendent 
to approve a sale, merger, acquisition of 
control, or other bank activity even if 
the statutory standards are not satisfied. 
AB 2521 Requires Automatic 
Approval of Certain Applications 
If the Superintendent Does Not Act 
Within Strict Timeframes 
The bill proposes a regulatory ap-
proval process using the so-called "deem-
ed approval" mechanism. 27 This means 
that for many kinds of decisions, the 
Superintendent's failure to act within 
strict timelines on an application by a 
bank or trust company for approval of 
some activity would result in automatic 
approval of that activity. Certain types 
of applications-such as those for ap-
proval of voluntary liquidation of a bank 
or trust company, purchases of a bank, 
mergers, or acquisitions of control-
would not be deemed approved, but the 
bill would nonetheless set a deadlint for 
decisions on each of these matters.28 
The "deemed approval" mechanism 
may deprive the State Department of 
Banking of the time it needs to fully 
evaluate applications by banks and trust 
companies. This weakness of a "deemed 
approval" regulatory method is com-
pounded by the bill's very short time 
limits for actions by the Superintendent. 
The basic time period is only 91 days.29 
The period for approval may be extend-
ed beyond 91 days only in "extraordinary 
circumstances. "JO These short timeframes 
and automatic approval provisions may 
make it very difficult for the Superintend-
ent to fully evaluate the effect on the 
public and on bank safety and soundness 
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of proposed bank activities, while at the 
same time fulfilling the Department's 
ongoing function of supervising existing 
banks. As the Department of Banking 
recently stated in a letter on the bill: 
The primary responsibility of 
the Superintendent is to ensure 
safety and soundness of banks. 
Accordingly, the Department should 
be able to give priority to func-
tions that directly support safety 
and soundness, such as making 
examinations, taking enforcement 
actions, and closing banks. How-
ever, establishing rigid timeframes 
for processing applications would 
make the Department 'driven' by 
applications, and allocation of the 
Department's resources would be 
dictated by application filings, 
which are beyond the power of 
the Department to either predict 
or control. Such a result would be 
contrary to the interest of safety 
and soundness.3 1 
AB 2521 Restricts the 
Superintendent's Ability to 
Refer Violations of Law 
for Civil Prosecution 
AB 2521 narrowly limits the authority 
of the Superintendent to refer evidence 
of an apparent violation of law. The bill 
would permit the Superintendent to refer 
evidence to state, local or federal agen-
cies which may indicate a violation of 
law only if the conduct "is punishable as 
a crime."32 However, many important 
consumer protection statutes are en-
forced as a matter of civil law by the 
Attorney General, district attorneys, city 
attorneys, and others. The Superintend-
ent should be free to refer evidence of 
potential violations of both civil and 
criminal laws to all appropriate state 
and federal enforcement agencies. If this 
topic is to be directly addressed in a 
rewrite, the proposed new section should 
require or at least presume the appro-
priateness of referral by the regulator of 
all civil and criminal violations to law 
enforcement authorities. 
The Bill Proposes an Inappropriate 
Level of Regulatory Discretion 
At the same time that it increases 
administrative discretion with respect to 
regulatory approvals, AB 2521 also would 
provide the Superintendent with a new, 
more liberal standard to allow the Super-
intendent to exempt banks from regula-
tions and orders.JJ For example, pro-
posed section 204(c) would permit the 
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Superintendent to waive any existing regula-
tion or order whenever he or she deems 
it to be either in the public interest or 
"necessary or appropriate .... " Current law 
limits waiver to instances where the Super-
intendent makes a finding that compliance 
is "not necessary in the public interest. ''34 
The ongoing crisis in the savings and 
loan industry has all too clearly shown 
the serious results of overly lenient reg-
ulation, particularly at a time when insti-
tutions are receiving new powers. In a 
recent special report by the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, the owner of one thrift 
association was quoted as describing this 
period in the savings and loan associa-
tion industry's history as "a crook's paradise. "35 
The purpose of statutory restrictions 
and statutory standards is to ensure that 
regulators do in fact apply adequate stand-
ards. Regulatory statutes are meaningless 
if they set forth standards on the one 
hand and then give the regulator broad 
power to exempt the regulated from 
those standards on the other hand. Vague 
standards for regulatory action make it 
very difficult to challenge a decision of a 
regulator which allows too much freedom 
of action to a regulated entity. A stand-
ardless delegation of legislative authority 
to a regulator also compels the regulator 
to spend more of his or her time justifying 
decisions, since he or she cannot merely 
point to a prohibition or a well-defined 
standard in current law to justify a denial 
of a requested exemption. Finally, vague 
standards ultimately consign the adequacy 
of regulation to the whim of the regulator. 
The Bill Would Repeal Existing 
Conflict of Interest Provisions 
AB 2521 would repeal Financial 
Code section 234, which sets forth a list 
of transactions with banks that are for-
bidden to the Superintendent and to Depart-
ment of Banking employees. The bill 
would replace this clear list of prohibited 
conduct in current law with a direction 
to the Superintendent to promulgate a 
code of ethics for Department personnel. 36 
Although there is nothing wrong with a 
code of ethics, a statute which directs 
preparation of such a code should require 
it to cover at least those activities now 
prohibited by the Financial Code. 
AB 2521 Would Allow Certain 
Self-Dealing Transactions 
Without Regulatory Approval 
Presently, a bank may not engage in 
transactions with its officers, members 
of its board of directors, or with owning 
entities without the permission of the 
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Superintendent of Banking.37 AB 2521 
would weaken this provision by permit-
ting such self-dealing transactions with-
out any notice to the regulator or any 
regulatory approval so long as the amount 
of the transaction is less than $500,000 
or 1% of the bank's gross capital.38 
THE BANKERS' PROPOSAL 
REDUCES CONSUMER RIGHTS 
AB 2521 proposes changes in the 
law which would hurt consumers. It 
would exempt nationally-chartered 
banks from a variety of consumer pro-
tection statutes; immunize banks for a 
broad variety of violations of consumer, 
civil rights, and other statutes; fail to 
prevent harmful branch closings; allow 
banks to prevent public access to infor-
mation filed with the State Department 
of Banking; require consumers to pay a 
bank's attorneys' fees; and eliminate 
other consumer rights. 
The Bill May Exempt National 
Banks from Many Consumer 
Protection Provisions of 
the Banking Code 
The bill may exempt national banks 
from certain consumer protection pro-
visions now applicable to them, as a 
result of the proposed redefinition of 
the term "bank" in AB 2521. The bill 
would define "bank" as those entities 
licensed under the state Banking Law to 
receive deposits. 39 This does not include 
federally-chartered banks. Thus, where 
the term "bank" is used in AB 2521, 
unless otherwise stated in the chapter, it 
refers only to state-chartered banks, un-
like the present code. By reenacting exist-
ing consumer protection provisions using 
the term "bank", while changing the 
definition of that term, AB 2521 may 
have the effect of exempting national 
banks from those provisions. The affect-
ed provisions cover deposit account dis-
closure requirements, consumer rights 
to notice and other protections in a 
banker's set-off of a consumer deposit 
against a debt owed to the bank, and 
other provisions.40 
The bill would confer on nationally-
chartered banks all the rights, powers, 
and immunities of state-chartered banks.41 
At the same time, AB 2521 would reduce 
the powers of the Superintendent of 
Banking over national banks. At present, 
the Superintendent requires reports from 
nationally-chartered banks, but AB 2521 
would eliminate that power by limiting 
its definition of "bank" to cover only 
state-chartered and foreign banks. 42 
3 
4 
There is no reason why the Superintend-
ent should not have power over national 
banks conducting business in California, 
at least to secure information and to 
enforce state consumer protection statutes. 
The Bill Creates Broad New 
Immunities from Suit for 
Banks and Trust Companies 
AB 2521 would immunize banks and 
trust companies from liability for a broad 
variety of violations of law if they simply 
correct the violation after the fact.43 No 
such broad immunity provision exists in 
the current Banking Law.44 An immunity 
from liability would seriously undermine 
the incentives to comply with various 
consumer protection and penalty stat-
utes. Consumer protection statutes which 
authorize the imposition of civil damages 
or penalties encourage banks to design 
their forms and procedures to comply 
with the law. The proposed immunity 
provisions turn the principle of consumer 
protection on its head. AB 2521 would 
allow banks one "free bite"; that is, the 
ability to escape liability for many types 
of violations if the bank merely corrects 
a violation after-and if-it is discovered 
by consumers or the regulator. 
Proposed section 447(a) of the bill 
provides that illegal activities of a bank 
or trust company are "deemed" to be in 
compliance with the law so long as the 
violation is not intentional, results from 
bona fide error in spite of reasonable 
procedures to avoid the error, and is 
corrected within sixty days of discovery. 
The section would prevent all civil liabili-
ty arising under any state law for such 
corrected errors. That immunity arguably 
could apply even to violations of laws 
other than the banking law, such as 
California's civil rights statute45 and its 
laws against false advertising46 and unfair 
and deceptive business practices.47 No 
other state statute offers such broad im-
munity to any industry.4B 
This immunity from all civil liability 
could be interpreted to immunize banks 
even from suits to declare their conduct 
illegal and enjoin it in the future. Fur-
ther, the section does not clearly require 
that correction be made for every person 
or account affected by the violation in 
addition to the person who complains. 
Thus, a bank or trust company might 
try to secure a defense to civil litigation 
under this section by correcting its error 
with respect to the consumer who com-
plains, without investigating whether the 
illegal practice has affected other cus-
tomers and without correcting the viola-
tion affecting those persons. 
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Proposed section 447(b) of AB 2521 
would immunize banks from civil liabili-
ty and civil penalties under the Banking 
Law for any act done or omitted "in 
good faith conformity" with any rule, 
regulation, written interpretation, order, 
or approval of the Superintendent of 
Banking. Any bank or trust company 
could attempt to secure this protection 
simply by obtaining an opinion from its 
lawyer that a contemplated act is "in 
conformity" with current rules, regula-
tions, interpretations, orders, or approv-
als of the Superintendent. As drafted, 
this section could arguably protect a 
bank when it engages in voluntary con-
duct not clearly forbidden by a specific 
regulation, interpretation, order or ap-
proval of the Department of Banking, 
even if it is not required by any law or 
order to engage in that conduct. 
Proposed section 447(c) would pre-
vent the imposition of penalties, fines, 
or punishments under any state law 
against any bank for any act or omis-
sion which complies with any rule, regula-
tion, interpretation, order, or approval 
of the Superintendent even if the act 
does not comply with other laws. Under 
this broad immunity, a bank might claim 
exemption from liability for discrimina-
tion in the hiring of employees for a new 
branch on the ground that the Banking 
Department had approved the opening 
of the branch, even though the applica-
tion for approval did not disclose that 
the bank intended to engage in discrimin-
ation in hiring staff for that branch. 
There is simply no reason why the Finan-
cial Code should grant special exemp-
tions to banks or trust companies from 
statutes which govern other types of 
businesses, including California's civil 
rights laws. 
The Bill Weakens Current Law 
Governing Bank Branch Relocations 
AB 2521 proposes to weaken the law 
governing changes in bank branch lo-
cation. 49 It would allow all moves of a 
branch of less than two miles to be 
approved without any consideration of 
the impact on the public. In many parts 
of California, particularly those poorly 
served by public transit, a two-mile move 
could have a significant impact on the 
availability of services to a community. 
In Los Angeles, for example, this pro-
vision would allow the closing of a 
branch in a minority neighborhood near 
downtown Los Angeles and a reopening 
in the financial district, or a closing 
in predominantly low-income South Pasa-
dena and a relocation to affluent Pasa-
dena, without any consideration of the 
impact of the move on the community. 
The bill also would allow a bank to 
claim that a branch closure is simply a 
"relocation" and thereby avoid the ninety-
day notice requirement and the limited 
scrutiny required for branch closings. 
Although existing law defines a reloca-
tion as a change in location of less than 
two miles,50 AB 2521 has no geographic 
limit on relocations. A bank which closes 
an office in East Los Angeles and opens 
one in Beverly Hills could call the change 
a "relocation". 
The bill also would eliminate all regu-
lation of the closing of automated teller 
machines. 51 Banks would not even have 
to give notice to customers before closing 
an ATM site. 
The Standards for Scrutinizing 
the Effect of Branch Closures 
Are Inadequate 
AB 2521 also fails to adequately pro-
tect bank customers from branch closures. 
The bill requires that notice regarding 
the closing of a branch must be given 
only after approval of the closing. 52 
Notice is not very meaningful when it is 
given only after it is too late for cus-
tomers to ask the Superintendent to deny 
approval of the closing. The bill would 
also make all branch closings automatic-
ally approved unless the Superintendent 
denies the application within thirty days.s3 
Current law contains no such automatic 
approval provision, but instead permits 
the Superintendent broad discretion to 
deny an application to open or close a 
branch. 54 A thirty-day period is far too 
short to enable consumers to learn about 
and object to the proposed change. More-
over, approval should never be automatic, 
especially after there has been an objection. 
Most importantly, the bill uses an 
unduly narrow standard for evaluating 
the impact of branch closures. It requires 
the Superintendent to approve every 
branch closure unless it would have a 
"seriously adverse effect" on the public.55 
Current Department regulations use the 
same language as the standard for the 
exercise of the Superintendent's dis-
cretion.56 However, those regulations 
merely set guidelines for the exercise of 
the Superintendent's discretion and do 
not compel him or her to approve every 
branch closure which is harmful to the 
community but the level of harm is less 
than "seriously adverse." By contrast, 
AB 2521 states that the Superintendent 
must approve every proposed branch 
closure if he or she finds that there 
would not be a "seriously adverse effect" 
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on the public convenience and advant-
age.57 This strict standard will severely 
limit the Superintendent's ability to pro-
tect underserved communities from fur-
ther withdrawals by banks. 
Banks should not be permitted to 
close branches indiscriminately. In 1983, 
there was one bank branch or office for 
every 5,200 Californians. By 1988, there 
was only one branch per 6,300 persons. 
Nearly three hundred bank branches or 
offices closed in California in those five 
years. 58 A bank which desires to close a 
branch in an underserved area should be 
required to prove that keeping the branch 
open will impair the bank's fiscal health. 
The bank should also be required to first 
offer the branch and its accounts for sale 
to any other financial institution which 
will take over the location and accounts 
and continue serving that community. 
The Bill Would Allow Banks to 
Prevent Public Access to Information 
Filed with the Superintendent 
AB 2521 would allow banks to pre-
vent public access to a variety of infor-
mation which banks and trust companies 
file with the Superintendent of Banking.59 
The bill permits a regulated bank or trust 
company to designate information which 
is to be treated as confidential. It requires 
the Superintendent to accept the bank 
or trust company's assertion of confiden-
tiality without any showing of good cause 
or any independent determination of the 
need for confidentiality.60 Reports which 
a bank has designated as confidential 
could not be disclosed to the public.61 They 
also could not be disclosed in connection 
with a civil or administrative proceeding 
brought by persons other than the Super-
intendent or a federal banking agency. 
Many consumer statutes carry civil penal-
ties and are enforced by law enforcement 
agencies or private attorneys general.62 
This section could deprive those law enforce-
ment agencies acting to enforce consumer 
protection statutes civilly from access to 
information filed by a bank with the State 
Banking Department. The bill's bias in favor 
of secrecy is further revealed in provisions 
that would prohibit even the bank or 
trust company which filed the information 
with the Banking Department from waiv-
ing the privilege against disclosure.63 
The Bill Would Require Some 
Depositors to Pay A Bank's 
Attorneys' Fees 
Another example of the way AB 2521 
is skewed in favor of banks and against 
consumers is its proposed revision of 
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current law governing awards of attor-
neys' fees to prevailing consumers in 
suits regarding the adequacy of bank 
disclosure of account terms and condi-
tions.64 Existing law permits the award 
of attorneys' fees to a prevailing con-
sumer in such suits but not to a prevail-
ing bank.65 The California Bankers Associ-
ation proposes to change that section to 
one which would also permit a bank 
which wins a lawsuit brought by a de-
positor over the adequacy of disclosure 
of account terms to receive a court 
award requiring the consumer to pay 
the bank's attorneys' fees. 66 Needless 
to say, such a provision would have a 
chilling effect on a consumer's will-
ingness to challenge a bank's disclosure 
practices, even if the consumer has a 
meritorious claim. 
The Bill Would Eliminate 
Other Consumer Rights 
The bill would also eliminate or 
reduce other consumer rights, including 
the right to withdraw a certificate of 
deposit or other insured time deposit 
without penalty if the deposit is sold 
to a new bank.67 AB 2521 would elimin-
ate that right for insured deposits.68 
A consumer who selects a particular 
bank with which to do business based 
upon that bank's location, personnel, or 
role in the community could suddenly 
find himself or herself in a deposit 
relationship with a bank which the con-
sumer never chose. The bill would also 
eliminate existing language and type size 
requirements concerning notices owed 
to consumers when a bank seizes a cus-
tomer's checking or savings account in 
payment for other debts owed by the 
customer to the bank under a so-called 
"banker's set-off. ''69 
The bill would allow a bank to enforce 
contracts against minors, who are other-
wise generally unable to contract.7° It 
would expand the pool of persons who 
are bound by a current section creating 
a conclusive presumption that the con-
sumer knew of an error in an account 
statement after a certain period of 
time.71 It would eliminate the right of 
depositors to hold banks liable for 
their common law negligence in ac-
cepting an unauthorized check.72 It 
would eliminate the six-month waiting 
period before a bank may open a safe 
deposit box and remove its contents for 
nonpayment of box rental fees.7 3 These 
examples illustrate just some of the 
changes in law proposed by AB 2521 
which directly reduce existing con-
sumer rights. 
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THE CBA PROPOSAL FAILS 
TO ADDRESS SERIOUS AND 
LONGSTANDING CONSUMER 
PROBLEMS WITH THE 
BANKING INDUSTRY 
The California Bankers Association's 
proposal utterly fails to address several 
serious and longstanding problems which 
California consumers have experienced 
with banks, including unaffordable check-
ing accounts; refusal of banks to cash 
government checks for non-depositors; 
bank branch closings; lack of any ceil-
ings on bank interest rates; and lack 
of any requirement that banks prove a 
record of good service to the community 
before the Superintendent of Banking 
gives them approvals to merge or expand. 
Most Banks Refuse to Cash 
Government Checks for 
Non-Depositors 
Most banks will not cash checks for 
persons without an account, yet accord-
ing to the General Accounting Office, 
75% percent of families receiving AFDC 
lack checking accounts. According to a 
recent report, 82% of 81 financial institu-
tions surveyed throughout California re-
fused to cash government checks for 
non-depositors at all, and 96% refused 
to do so free of charge.74 Even those 
few financial institutions which did cash 
the checks often allowed branch man-
agers the discretion to refuse to provide 
the service.75 Californians without check-
ing accounts are often forced to use 
high-cost non-bank check-cashing ser-
vices. These services charge from 1-6% 
to cash government assistance checks, 
with an average charge of 2.15%. 76 On 
a $500 check, 2% is a $10 fee, and 6% is 
a $30 fee. Any new version of the bank-
ing law should require that banks which 
choose to accept government deposits 
must cash government checks for non-
depositors without charge. 
Consumers Need Low-Cost 
Checking Accounts 
Consumers of low or modest income 
levels often cannot afford the monthly 
service charges and high minimum bal-
ance requirements of most checking 
accounts. One study showed that 53% 
of persons who used money orders could 
not afford a checking account, found 
the service charges too high, or could 
not accept minimum balance require-
ments.77 Charges paid by bank custom-
ers rose 120% from 1978 to 1982 (from 
$4.9 billion to $10.8 billion). 78 High 
s 
6 
checking account fees also have a dis-
proportionate impact on minorities. One 
study showed that only 47% of minority 
families have checking accounts, as com-
pared to 85% of white families.79 The · 
federal banking regulators have urged 
financial institutions to offer basic bank-
ing services at no or low cost. 80 
The fundamental characteristics of a 
basic checking account are ease of ac-
count opening and low cost to maintain. 
Such an account should, at minimum, 
have the following characteristics: no 
monthly fee or a fee of not more than 
$1 per month; no per-<:heck or per-deposit 
charge for the first ten checks and the 
first three deposits per month; no mini-
mum balance to open, and no minimum 
balance to maintain; and identification 
requirements which may be met by the 
low-income population. Any rewrite of 
the banking code should address this 
important consumer problem by requir-
ing that state-chartered banks make 
available affordable basic accounts of 
this type. 
Better Safeguards Are Needed 
to Protect Consumers From the 
Impact of Branch Closures 
The problem of bank branch closures 
was addressed earlier in this article. In 
addition to the timing of notice and 
standard of approval issues already dis-
cussed there, any rewrite of the Financial 
Code should affirmatively and aggressive-
ly address the problem of underserved 
communities, possibly by requiring a 
bank which desires to close a branch to 
first offer the branch and its accounts 
for sale to any other financial institution 
which is willing to take over the location 
and accounts and continue serving that 
community. In addition, the Superintend-
ent could be directed by law to identify 
those communities which are underserved 
and to deny permission for further branch 
closures in those areas unless the closure 
is necessary to preserve the financial 
soundness of the bank. 
Consumers Deserve the Protection 
of An Interest Rate Ceiling 
Most interest rates charged by banks 
in California are totally unregulated. 
AB 2521 proposes a broadening of the 
exemptions for bank subsidiaries from 
the anti-usury provisions of the Califor-
nia Constitution. State-chartered banks 
have charged Californians as much as 
32-226% as an annual percentage interest 
rate. New York, by contrast, has a gen-
eral ceiling on interest rates of 25%. 81 
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Any comprehensive banking bill should 
include a ceiling on consumer interest 
rates by banks and all other lenders of 
not more than 25% annual percentage 
interest rate. 
Banks Should Prove That 
They Adequately Serve the 
Community Before Receiving 
Regulatory Approvals 
Under the federal Community Re-
investment Act, federal agencies regu-
1 a ting depository institutions must 
consider "the institution's record of 
meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community, including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods ... "82 when they 
evaluate applications for transactions 
such as acquisitions, mergers, or new 
branches. Banks are subject to regulatory 
scrutiny concerning whether they have 
met these obligations each time they 
seek a variety of approvals from the 
federal banking regulators.83 The State 
Superintendent of Banking should have 
the same power and obligation to exam-
ine a state-chartered bank's record of 
meeting community needs before the De-
partment grants regulatory permission 
for sales, mergers, acquisitions, changes 
in branch location, waiver of regulations, 
or other regulatory approvals. A state 
banking charter is no less a privilege 
than a federal charter. Nonetheless, there 
is no provision in the state banking law 
which requires the Superintendent of 
Banking to consider the records of state-
chartered banks before granting regula-
tory approvals. Thus, each section of 
the bill which deals with regulatory ap-
provals should require the Superintend-
ent to find, as a precondition for approv-
al, that the applying bank has an excellent 
record of serving the deposit and lending 
needs of low- and moderate-income Cali-
fornians, or has proposed a plan to do so. 
CBA Has Not Shown a Need 
for a Comprehensive Rewrite of 
the California Banking Law 
At the first informational hearing on 
AB 2521 held by the Assembly Finance 
and Insurance Committee and the Senate 
Banking Committee, bill authors and 
committee chairs Assemblymember Pat-
rick Johnston and Senator Rose Ann 
Vuich called upon the California Bank-
ers Association (CBA), as the sponsor 
of AB 2521, to explain why it believes 
that a substantial revision of the bank-
ing law is necessary. CBA responded by 
discussing the changes in the banking 
industry, such as new technology, which 
have occurred since the current code 
was written. However, CBA did not offer 
any reason why those technological 
changes require a complete revision of 
the Banking Law, nor did it point to 
any changes in the banking industry 
that compel the particular amendments 
proposed by CBA in AB 2521. CBA 
representatives talked about the benefits 
of a well-organized code, but the pro-
visions of AB 2521 go far beyond simple 
renumbering or reorganization. CBA 
still has made no showing of need for 
such a broad rewrite of California's funda-
mental banking law. 
CONCLUSION 
The California Bankers Association 
has proposed sweeping changes in the 
division of the Financial Code governing 
banks, yet it has not shown a need for 
these changes. The serious problems and 
deficiencies in AB 2521 are a timely 
illustration of the principle that regu-
lated industries should not write regula-
tory laws. 
In her opening statement at the joint 
informational hearing, Senator Vuich 
called upon the California Bankers Associ-
ation to address how this bill would 
benefit California consumers. Consumers 
Union believes that the unfortunate 
answer to this question is that the bill as 
presently drafted does not benefit and in 
fact harms consumers. 
The legislature should decline to enact 
AB 2521 and rewrite the California Finan-
cial Code governing banks unless its 
provisions reducing consumer rights and 
weakening the effectiveness of the regula-
tory structure are removed, and affirma-
tive provisions are added to address 
longstanding consumer problems with 
banks, including the issues of access to 
check cashing services by banks, access 
to affordable checking accounts, ceilings 
on interest rates, better scrutiny of 
branch closures, and stimulation of in-
vestment in low-income housing and com-
munity economic development. 
AB 2521 authors Johnston and Vuich 
have stated that they plan to hold a 
series of public hearings on the bill to 
clearly identify those aspects of the bill 
which propose substantive changes and 
to fully explore the issues raised by these 
proposed changes. Those changes should 
be separated from the recodification as-
pects of the bill and rejected. If any bill 
which proposes substantive changes to 
the law governing banks is to move 
forward, that bill should also make 
changes which address important con-
sumer problems. 
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